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The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the
Pro-Israeli lobby on America's policy toward the Palestinian question.
The significance of this study lies in the fact that it under¬
scores the importance of the role of an interest group, specifically
the pro-Israeli lobby, in the policy formulation process. The major
finding of this study is that this lobby has been able to exert pres¬
sure on the White House, the Congress, the media, academic and research
institutions, and the churches in total support of the State of Israel.
The main sources of information for this study were obtained
from publications such as Paul Findley,They Dare to Speak Out (1985),
Mohammed K. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians (1981),
William R. Polk, The Arab World (1980), Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing
Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (1982), as
well as a variety of books, journals, and periodicals.
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Zionists and pro-Israeli organizations sympathetic to Israel
have worked relentlessly in influencing American policy in the Middle
East which is favorable to Israel and totally ignores the aspirations
of the Palestinians to establish a homeland and self-determination.
These groups have paid much attention to cultivating relationships with
the White House, the Congress, the mass media, academic institutions
and churches. These pro-Israeli groups have skillfully exploited these
relationships in such a way that they have become effective instruments
in the hands of the Zionist lobby in pressuring American policy makers
and officials.
The Zionist lobby in the United States has its roots in Ameri¬
can Zionism. According to Omar:
American Zionists were involved in all of the Interna¬
tional Zionist Congress and by 1898 they had begun to
erect the instrumentalities which would later play such
a major role in the winning of American Jewry for the
Zionist program.1
Omar indicated that Jews in the United States had started
organizing themselves since the early 1840s by establishing special
organizations such as:
^M. Zayyan Omar, U.S. in the Middle East Historical Survey




1. B'nai B'rith, which was founded by Geman-American Jews
in 1843. This organization is the oldest and most influential of the
mass organizations. B'nai B'rith numbered approximately 200,000
members in 1944.
2. National Council of Jewish Women was founded in 1893 to
unite American Jewish women. It was also dedicated to a broad program
of social service and international and Jewish affairs.
3. American Jewish Congress was established during World War
I to secure Jewish civil rights. It played a central role in mobiliz-
2
ing American Jewish support to Zionist activities.
Omar also stated that these three organizations, as well as
other Zionist organizations, had contributed approximately $38 million
to settlers in Palestine before 1929. Moreover, these organizations
played a very important role in the area of propaganda which consisted
mainly of the following: (1) propaganda themes or appeals; (2) press
and publications; (3) rallies and public meetings; and (4) Jewish edu-
3
cation and youth activities.
The American Zionist Council (AZC), which was established in
the 1930s, is another important organization. After the creation of
the State of Israel, the AZC's major function was to engage in an on¬
going campaign among Congressmen, government officials, and the media
to enlist sympathy and support for Israel. It also worked to counter




such as the American Council for Judaism. In 1954, the AZC closed its
Washington, D.C. office and the American Israeli Council Public Affairs
Committee was established to carry on political and lobbying activities
4
in Washington, D. C.
The American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is now
the most effective lobby in Washington, D.C, It is only a part of the
Israeli lobby, but it has very significant impact on the formulation
of public policy. AIPAC has gained control of virtually all of Capitol
5
Hill's action on Middle East policy. According to Findley:
AIPAC's preeminence is relatively new. Only a few years ago
the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
was regarded as the strongest pro-Israeli lobby in Washing¬
ton, speaking as it did for the 1eadership of 38 main Jewish
groups. The Anti-Defamation League, American Jewish Com¬
mittee and AIPAC were generally in its shadow.6
The pro-Israeli lobby's total domination of American foreign
policy in the Middle East is frightening. This lobby seems to be omni¬
potent to the extent that Senators and Congressmen are afraid of court¬
ing its displeasure because such an action will result in loosing an
election. Concerned Americans are also scared to criticize its acti¬
vities because they will be branded as anti-Semitic.
The purpose of this study therefore is to critically examine
the various avenues through which the pro-Israeli lobby has influenced
America's policy toward the Palestinian question.
^Mohammed K. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians
(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1981), pp. 163-164.
5
Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out (Westport, CT: Lawrence
Hill and Company, 1985), p. 25.
6lbid., p. 26.
II. THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
No place in the world is more conducive to persistent and vivid
memories than the Middle East. Palestine is the heart of the Middle
East, the Holy Land of believers, and the rendezvous of ancient civili¬
zations.
Archaeological scrutiny and scientific studies have indicated
that the ancestral inhabitants of Palestine were the Canaanites. The
Canaanites were Semitic Arab tribes that migrated to Palestine from the
Arabian peninsula about 3,000 B.C. The Jebusites, who were Canaanites
Arabs, built their capital and they named it Uru Salem. Later, they
changed its name to Jebusite.^
In 1950 B.C., Abraham, who is referred to as the father of
prophets, moved to Palestine. He was a Semitic Aramaen Arab, and his
original roots were in the Arabian peninsula before migrating and
settling in Iraq. Abraham preached the worship of El-Illah Allah, the
universal God, among Canaanites in Palestine. He was also the founder
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of the Holy Kaabah in Makkah, which is God's oldest house of worship.
During the period of time between nineteenth century B.C. and
thirteenth century B.C., the Jebusites struggled to protect their
^Hazem Zaki Nuseibah, Palestine and the United Nations (New




capital Uru Salem (Jebusite) from Habirus (nomads) who were related to
prophet Abraham. For this reason, the Jebusites allied with the
Pharaoes of Egypt to protect their capital from invasion. Uru Salem
and its citadel, which was known as the Citadel of Canaan or the Citadel
of Zion on Mount Zion, remained impregnable to all invaders until the
3
era of King David.
In the thirteenth century B.C., the prophet Moses and Habirus
(The Jews) came to Palestine from Egypt. The Habirus, under Joshua's
leadership, attacked and conquered Palestine. In spite of the ferocity
of the Jewish occupation, the Jebusites remained in Palestine and held
on to the capital city, Uru Salem. In 1049, B.C., King David occupied
4
Uru Salem by seizing its water supply.
Historical studies indicate that the Jews established two king¬
doms in Palestine; one of them in the northern part of the West Bank,
and the other in the southern part of the West Bank. Despite this, the
5
Arabs remained in Palestine and in their city, Uru Salem.
The Jews were in disagreement with all of the nations around
them and the Babylonians took advantage of this situation. In 599
B.C., the Babylonian king, Nebuchadnezzar II, attacked the Jews and
destroyed their kingdom in Palestine. The Babylonians took the Jews
from Palestine to Iraq as captives. The Jews remained in Iraq until
the Persians conquered the Babylonians in 539 B.C., at which time, the
^Ibid., pp. 12-13.
^Arif Basha Al-Arif, Tarikh A1-Quds [The History of Jerusalem],
(Cairo: Dar Al-Maarif, 1951), pp. 14-16.
^Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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Persians allowed the Jews to return to Palestine. In 352 B.C., the
Greeks invaded Palestine and so began the Greek era, which lasted until
63 B.C. when the Romans seized Palestine. In 330 A.D. the Bezants
invaded Palestine and remained there until the Islamic era.
In 636 A.D., the Islamic army reached Palestine and Caliph
Omar Ibn Al-Khattab (586-664 A.D.) entered Jerusalem which became A1-
Quds (meaning "Holy';) or Bait Al-Maqdiss (The House of Holiness). The
Caliph Omar was welcomed and aided by a family reunion with his fellow
Christian Arabs.^
Palestine became a province of the Ottoman Empire in 1516, but
the Turks did not impose their language or their culture on Palestine.
However, the Ottoman Empire, in its last days, became weak, and hence,
its power and control over its provinces also became weak. Under these
circumstances, Jewish colonization in Palestine began, and their immi¬
gration started in 1882.^
The first Zionist conference in Basle, Switzerland (1897), which
was led by the father of the Zionist Movement, Theodor Herzl (1860-1904),
planned for the implementation of many secret policies, one of which was
the establishment of a homeland for Jews and for the movement to concen¬
trate its efforts in influencing European powers, especially Great
^Ibid., pp. 21-40.
^Nuseibah, Palestine and the United Nations, pp. 12-13.
O
Edward W. Said, The Question of Palestine, 2nd ed. (New York:
The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1980), pp. 8-11.
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Britain, to help in attaining this end. The Zionist efforts during
and after World War I resulted in the occurrence of two important
events:
1. The Sykes-Picot secret agreement between France and England
signed in 1916 dismembered the Ottoman Empire and its provinces.
Therefore, natural Syria which included Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and
present-day Syria, were dismembered in order to facilitate the estab¬
lishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine. Under the Sykes-Picot
agreement, Palestine was to be international, except for the Port of
Acre which was to be British.^^
2. The Balfour Declaration (November 2, 1917).-Below is an
excerpt from the letter sent to Lord Rothschild.
Dear Lord Rothschild:
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf
of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration
of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been
submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
His Majesty's Government views with favor the estab¬
lishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish
people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate
the achievement of this object, it being clearly under¬
stood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish commu¬
nities in Palestine, or the rights and political status
enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
I should be grateful if you would bring this decla¬
ration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.il
^Omar, U.S. In the Middle East 1800-1950, Arab-Israeli
Conflict 1948-1967, pp. 114-115.
^*^William R. Polk, The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the




Indeed, the Balfour Declaration was a clear commitment from
the British government to Zionists not only to facilitate the Jewish
immigration to Palestine, but to use the mandatory period, 1918-1948,
in establishing the State of Israel. It is necessary here to mention
that the British ignored the mandate of the League of Nations which
was inspired by President Woodrow Wilson and others on April 25, 1922.
The League of Nations Mandate Article 22 actually recog¬
nized provisionally the independence of Palestine as far
back as 28 June 1919. The Article reads as follows:
Certain communities formerly belonging to the Tur¬
kish Empire have reached a stage of development where
their existence as independent nations can be provi¬
sionally recognized subject to the rendering of amdinis-
trative advice and assistance by the Mandatory until
such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes
of these communities must be a principal consideration
in the selection of the Mandatory.
Between 1918 and 1948 some major events occurred that signifi¬
cantly affected developments in Palestine:
1. The Jewish immigration to Palestine enormously increased
such that the Jewish population rose from 8 percent in 1917 to 30 per¬
cent of the population in Palestine in 1947.
2. Under British protection and help, the Jews organized
themselves by establishing their institutions, seizing more land, and
most importantly, organizing their underground army (Haganah) which
had been used against the Palestinians, and which eventually became
the Israeli army.
3. The Palestinians expressed indignation against suppression
by both the British and the Jews, and this resulted in the disturbances
12
Nuseibah, Palestine and the United Nations, p. 19.
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of 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1933.
4. Between 1936 and 1939, there were numerous rebellions in
which tens of thousands of Palestinians lost their lives due to the
suppression by the British army and the Jewish underground organiza¬
tions such as the Haganah, the Palmach, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the
Stern Gang. Also, tens of thousands were detained in concentration
camps and prisons.
5. The British government, in response to the situation in
Palestine, established many commissions to visit Palestine in order
to investigate the situation there. The first commission that was
sent was the Haycraft Commission in 1921, then the Shaw Commission in
1929, followed by the Hope-Simpson Commission in 1930, the Peel Commis¬
sion, and the British Royal Commission in 1937. All these commissions
came to identical conclusions regarding the root causes of Palestinian
resistance; they stated that Palestinians wanted to gain their national
independence and were afraid of the establishment of the Jewish national
home in Palestine.
6. The British government issued a White Paper in May of 1939
in response to the Palestinian uprising which started in 1936 against
British policies and Jewish occupation. According to Nuseibah:
That White Paper remained applicable until the British,
fed up with the problem, handed it over to the trustee¬
ship of the U.N. That White Paper stated, inter alia
(that):
(1) The proposal of partition recommended by the Royal
Commission, namely the establishment of self-
supporting independent Arab and Jewish States within
Palestine, has been found to be impracticable.
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(2) H.M. Government now declares unequivocally that it
is not part of their policy that Palestine should
become a Jewish State. They would indeed regard it
as contrary to their obligations to the Arabs under
the Mandate, as well as to the assurances which have
been given to the Arab people in the past [presumably
referring to the Hussein-McMahon agreements] that the
Arab population of Palestine should not be made the
subject of a Jewish State against their will.
(3) The object of H.M. Government is the establishment
within 10 years of an independent Palestine State.
7. On February 14, 1947, the British government announced that
it would refer the problems to the United Nations. Hence, the UN
promptly set up a Special Commission on Palestine,with representa¬
tives from eleven member states. The Commission produced the Parti¬
tion Plan, approved by the UN General Assembly in November of 1947.
Palestine was to be divided into two separate Jewish and Arab parts,
with Jerusalem under international control.
8. By May 1948, the British left Palestine and on May 14, 1948,
David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the State of Israel with Chaim Vleizmann
as president. Russia and the USA promptly welcomed and recognized
the new state.
The declaration of Israel was the beginning of a continuous
series of conflicts and wars between Arabs and Israel. In 1948, the
armies of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon entered
Palestine to aid Palestinians against Jews who started expelling the
Palestinians and seizing their land. However, due to the lack of
arms, ammunition and tactis, in addition to the absence of unity,
the Arabs lost the battle. Israel, with a great deal of help from
13 Ibid., p. 22.
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eastern Europe and American Jews, occupied all of Palestine except the
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and expelled the Palestinians. The Pales¬
tinians then became refugees in the West Bank, Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon,
Syria, Egypt and Iraq.
On October 23 and 24, 1956, a secret meeting took place at
Sevres, near Paris, at which Britian, France, and Israel devised a
14
plan to attack Egypt. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces launched
an attack on Egypt, occupying the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Desert.
At the same time, British and French forces landed in Port Said in an
attempt to sieze the Suez Canal. In the face of pressure on Britian,
France and Israel by the UN General Assembly, world public opinion and
the United States, the three states had to withdraw from Egypt.
In the early 1960s, the Palestinians started organizing them¬
selves. The Arab leaders, in a summit conference held in Egypt in
January 1964, agreed to set up the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) for the purpose of organizing the Palestinian people to enable
them to' carry out their role in liberating their homeland and deter¬
mining their destiny.
On June 5, 1967, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egyptian
and Syrian military airports. Soon afterward, Israel invaded the old
city of Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Sinai Desert and the
Syrian Golan Heights. Israel claimed that it undertook this hostile
^'^Geoffrey Regan, Israel and the Arabs, 3rd ed. (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 28.
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action only in retaliation against the Egyptians for blocking the
Tiran Straits on May 22, 1967. The 1967 Arab-Israeli War was a big
disaster for the Arabs and for the Palestinians. It is estimated that
at least 1,375,915 Palestinians became refugees, but most likely the
actual count was much higher.
In 1968, Yasser Arafat became the Chairman of the PLO, and he
worked feverishly to win the recognition of his movement as a govern¬
ment in exile by many countries in the world. Also, under his leader¬
ship, the PLO became a major force in Middle-Eastern politics and he
built an effective force which became a real threat to Israel and a
real hope for Palestinians who aspired to return to their homeland.
The failure of the United Nations to obtain Arabs and Israeli
acceptance of the Security Council's Resolution 242 of November 1967--
which demanded Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories as well as
a settlement that would include recognition of Israel by the Arabs and
a fair deal for the Palestinians—led to the War of Attrition in 1970
between Egypt and Israel. The same failure also led to the 1973 war
which was started by a massive Egyptian and Syrian attack on the Israeli
forces in Sinai and Golan Heights on October 6, 1973. The Egyptian army
destroyed the Bar-Lev line beyond the Suez Canal and the Syrian army
took back the City of El-Quneitra.
In November 1977, President Sadat visited Israel and addressed
the Knesset, Israel's Parliament, declaring his willingness to obtain
a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. In September 1978, at Camp
David, Sadat and Begin, the leaders of the two opposing nations,
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reached an agreement which is called the Camp David Agreements. The
core of the agreements was an Israeli-Egyptian peace, under which
Egypt would regain all the Sinai over a three-year period on condition
that it limited its military forces there. On March 26, 1979, Egypt
and Israel signed the peace agreement in Washington, and in May of the
same year, Israel had begun withdrawal from the Sinai. The Camp David
Agreement not only isolated Egypt from the Arab world, but the Agree¬
ment failed to deal with the fundamental issue of homeland and self-
determination for the Palestinians.
III. THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Although the United States publicly proclaims that it supports
the rights of all oppressed people to self-determination, her pro-
Israeli policies in the Middle East have undermined the Palestinian
struggle for self-determination and establishment of a homeland.
America's staunch support for Israel is due mainly to the preponderant
influence of the pro-Israeli lobby in this country.
The Zionist lobby has dominated the American policy toward
the Middle East because:
Presidents fear it. Congress does its bidding. Presti¬
gious universities shun academic programs and grants which
it opposes. Giants of the media and military leaders
buckle under its pressure. Instead of having their argu¬
ments and opinions judged on merit, critics of Israel
suddenly find their motivations, their integrity, and
basic moral values called into question. No matter how
moderate their criticism, they may be characterized as
pawns of the oil lobby, apologists for Arab terrorists,
or even anti-Semitic.^
The main problem is that the American Jews wield dispropor¬
tionate pov/er in this country and this enormous power has provided
them with access to corridors of decison/policy making. The pro-
Israeli lobby has skillfully manipulated the White House, the Congress,
the media, academic and research institutions, as well as churches to
blindly support Israel. The analysis section of this study examines
the modus operand! of the pro-Israeli lobby.
1
Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 315.
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rV. METHODOLOGY
This study is basically a descriptive analysis. It describes
the relationship between various U.S. administrations and the State of
Israel since its establishment in 1948, as well as how the pro-Israeli
lobby operates in order to impact upon America's policy toward the
Palestinian question.
The nature of this study necessitated the reliance, primarily,
on secondary data. As such, the writer reviewed publications such as
Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out (1985), Mohammed K. Shadid, The
United States and the Palestinians (1981), William R. Polk, The Arab
World (1980), Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Percep¬
tions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (1982), as well as other books, jour¬
nals, and periodicals in order to obtain the necessary information
about this lobby and its modus operandi.
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V. A REVIEW OF U.S./ISRAELI RELATIONS FROM TRUMAN'S
ADMINISTRATION TO REAGAN'S ADMINISTRATION
In 1945, Harry Truman became the President of the United
States and during this period, the Palestinian issue and Zionist
pressure came to a head. According to Margaret Truman, "From the
moment Dad took office, American Jews began pressuring him to support
the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine."^ President Truman expressed
to Rabbi Wise, the Chairman of the American Zionist Emergency Council,
that he was in agreement with the expressed policy of the Roosevelt
administration on Palestine, and that he would do everything possible
2
to carry out that policy. President Roosevelt had conferred with
King I bn Saud of Saudi Arabia on this matter on his way home from
Yalta, and promised that the United States would confer with Pales¬
tine's Arab neighbors before supporting Jewish immigration to that part
3
of the world. Although Truman was sympathetic to the Jews, the
Zionists felt that was not enough; as such they made Truman a prime
target of Zionist pressures. In 1947, during and after the United
Nations' debates over the partition of Palestine, when the Zionists
^Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York; William Morrow
and Co., Inc., 1973), p. 298.
2
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 1942-
1952, vol. 1 (New York: New American Library, 1961), p. 67.
3
Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 298.
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were lobbying for American support and acceptance of the UN's Parti¬
tion Resolution, they exerted so much pressure on President Truman
that he declared that "I do not think I ever had as much pressure and
4
propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance."
Despite these pressures, the Zionists warned President Truman
that he was in danger of losing Jewish votes during the next election
if he did not act promptly on behalf of Jews in Palestine and their
5
goal of establishing the State of Israel. According to David Hirst,
Truman played shamelessly for the Jewish vote. He told
ambassadors to the Arab world: 'I am sorry, gentlemen,
but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are
anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hund¬
reds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.'^
Margaret Truman indicated that the Zionist pressure was so strong that
the United States, on May 14, 1948, officially recognized the State of
Israel and that recognition was given only eleven minutes after the
prodamation of Israel.^ According to Shadid:
Truman's role in the creation of the State of Israel
did not come to an end with his recognition of the
state. He further committed the United States to the
survival and security of that state. That commitment
has been reiterated by all American presidents.^
Findley stated that "during a 1949 White House visit, chief
Rabbi of Israel told the President [Truman] 'God put you in your
^Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 346.
5
Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 299.
C
David Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, 2nd ed. (London:
Faber and Faber, 1984), p. 114.
^Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 389,
O
Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p. 39.
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mother's womb so you would be the instrument to bring about the
9
rebirth of Israel after 2000 years." The Truman administration was
so concerned with the survival of the new state, that it worked to
achieve the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 with England and France.
According to Omar:
The three governments agreed on the following matters:
(1) To supply arms to the Arab states and Israel for
the purpose of assuring their internal security and
their legitimate self defense; (2) That countries
which received arms assured that they [would] not
intend to undertake acts of aggression against any
other state; (3) The three governments would take
immediate action if the purchasing [was] to violate
frontiers or armistice lines both within and outside
the U.N. to prevent such violation.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, on the other hand, strongly
resisted pressures from the Israeli lobby. On three occasions, he
forced Israel to abandon major policies to which it was publicly and
strongly committed. The first occasion was in September 1953, when he
ordered a cancellation of all aid until Israel stopped work on a
diversion canal being constructed on the Jordan River in violation
of the 1949 cease-fire agreements. That project would help assure
Israelfi control of water resources which were important to all nations
in the region. The second occasion was in October 1956, when Israel,
France, and Britain invaded Egypt. Eisenhower immediately cancelled
all aid to Israel. The third occasion was in 1957, when Israel
9
Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 117.
10
p. 103.
Omar, U.S. In the Middle East - Arab-Israeli Conflict,
19
refused to withdraw from the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip and
Sharm el-Sheik.^^
Despite tremendous pressure from Zionists and pro-Israeli
forces on the administration of Eisenhower, he refused to succumb.
In Findley's view, this was due to the fact that:
Eisenhower had already made his reputation. He was
already a great man in the eyes of the country, and
he wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he be-
1ieved.i2
According to Hirst, Eisenhower's independence from the Zionist lobby
was manifested again during the Suez War in 1956 when he:
... quickly secured the withdrawal of the chastened British
and French by withholding oil supplies from them, but it
took six months to prise Israel out of all Egyptian terri¬
tory. It was only by raising the threat of economic sanc¬
tions, to be applied by all members of the UN, that he
managed it, 'Should a nation,' he asked in a special tele¬
vision broadcast, 'which attacks and occupies foreign terri¬
tory in the face of UN disapproval be allowed to impose con¬
ditions on its own withdrawal? If we agree that armed
attack can properly achieve the purpose of the assailant,
then I fear we will have turned back the clock of interna¬
tional order
The Eisenhower administration was severely criticized by the
Zionists and pro-Israelis for putting pressure on Israel to withdraw
from the occupied Egyptian territories as well as when the administra¬
tion cancelled all aid to Israel in September of 1953. Findley
reported that:
Dr. Israel Goldstein told an audience of 20,000 celebrat¬
ing Jerusalem's 3000th birthday at New York's Madison
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp. 117-120.
^^Ibid., p. 96.
^^Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, p. 202.
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Square Garden: 'Peace will not be helped by withholding
aid as an instrument of unwarranted duress.' New York
members of Congress joined the bandwagon. Senator Robert
Wagner called the decision 'cruel and intemperate,' and
Congressman Emanuel Celler denounced it as a 'snap judge¬
ment. ' All major Jewish organizations condemned the
action.
However, the Eisenhower administration's apparently strong
stance against Israel should not be misconstrued as support for the
Palestinian cause. In fact, the actions of that administration were
influenced by two important political considerations. The first
reason was that the attack on Egypt in 1956 by Britain, France and
Israel occurred at about the same time the Soviet Union attacked
15
Hungary. Therefore, in order for the United States to denounce the
Soviet attack, it had no choice but to protest against the actions
of her allies, Britian, France and Israel.
The second reason was that the U.S. was working on a plan
developed by the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, to surround
the communists (Russia and China) by signing treaties and pacts among
countries in Indo-China, the Middle East, and Europe. The U.S. was
therefore looking forward to the day when Arab countries such as
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia would join the Baghdad Pact
of 1955.^^ Consequently, the U.S. found the attack on Egypt to be
detrimental to its foreign policy objectives.
14
Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 118.
^^Polk, The Arab World, pp. 328-329.
^Seter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1948, 4th ed.
(London, England: Longman Group UK, Ltd., 1987), on. 221-230.
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It is important to underscore the fact that the Eisenhower
administration regarded the Palestinians as refugees who should be
compensated rather than displaced people who are entitled to self-
determination and recovery of their homeland. According to Polk,
Secretary of State, Dulles, during an appearance before the Council
of Foreign Relations, offered the following formula for resolving the
Palestinian issue when he:
... suggested that an international loan might enable
'Israel to pay the compensation which is due and which
would enable many of the refugees to find for them¬
selves a better way of life.' He further offered Amer¬
ican assistance in determining satisfactory frontiers
which the United States would then guarantee against
aggression.17
However, Eisenhower's decision that Israel withdraw from the
Egyptian territories was "the last time the United States ever took,
and persisted in, forceful action against the strong wishes of an
18
Israeli government."
The presidency of John Fitzgerald Kennedy was greeted by a
strong determination on the part of Zionists and the pro-Israeli lobby
to protect Israel from the United States' pressures. In pursuance of
this objective, the Zionist forces persuaded Kennedy--during his 1960
presidential campaign--to accept their financial support of his cam¬
paign; in return, he would allow these pro-Israelis to have the sole
responsibility of setting the Middle East policy during his tenure.
According to Findley:
^^Polk, The Arab World, p. 325.
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 124.
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... Kennedy had gone to dinner with a small group of
wealthy and prominent Jews in New York. An episode
of the evening troubled him deeply. Describing it
to (his journalist friend, Charles Bartlett), as an
‘amazing experience,' he said one of those at the
dinner party - he did not identify him by name - told
him he knew his campaign was in financial difficulty
and, speaking for the group, offered 'to help and help
significantly' if Kennedy as president 'would allow
them to set the course of Middle East policy over the
next four years.' It was an astounding proposition.
John Kennedy "fared well on election day in 1960, receiving
82 percent of the Jewish vote; he made a decision vital to Israel's
military plans. He approved, forthe first time, the U.S. sale of
20
weapons to Israel."
Concerning the Palestinian issue, the administration of Presi¬
dent Kennedy had arranged with the United Nations to send the Presi¬
dent of the Carnegie Foundation and a former member of the Policy
Planning Staff, Dr. Joseph Johnson, to the Middle East for the purpose
of consulting with concerned governments in reference to the refugee
21
problem.
Even though the American government arranged the Johnson
mission, it still sought to help Israel more than settling the
refugee problem. According to Polk:
The idea was to put the issue before the refugees,
within limited areas of choice, and under the active
supervision of the United Nations, in accordance
with the resolutions passed by the United Nations.
Each individual refugee was to exercise his right to
^^Ibid., p. 114.
^'^Ibid., p. 120.
^^Polk, The Arab World, p. 338.
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'return' to receive compensation. The /terican govern¬
ment believed that when actually presented with the
possibility of return, each refugee would realize that
there was no Palestine to return to and that going to
Israel constituted a migration, an unattractive migra¬
tion at that, to a new and alien country. The over¬
whelming majority of the refugees would presumably
decline 'return' and accept compensation. The crucial
point was that, having been offered a choice, the
refugees would lose their moral position; they would
have been granted their acknowledged right to choose.
Politically, they would no longer be on dead center;
they would be free to, and obviously would be encouraged
to settle in Arab countries, or, perhaps, to migrate
abroad.22
On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in
Dallas, Texas and Lyndon Johnson became President of the United States.
According to Miller:
One of Johnson's first statements concerning Israel was
when he said to an Israeli diplomat, shortly after the
assassination of Kennedy, 'You have lost a very great
friend, but you have found a better one.' And I would
say that everything he did as President supported that
statement.23
In describing the close ties between President Johnson and the
Jews, Miller indicated that:
... some place in Lyndon Johnson's blood there are a
great many Jewish corpuscles. He really reminds me of
a six-foot-three-inch slightly corny Texas version of a
rabbi or a diamond merchant on Forty-seventh Street.
He is just as likely to spill out all his woes, his
vanity, his joy as the most gesticulating Jew.24
Ephraim Evron, the Deputy Chief in the Israeli embassy in Washington
was a very close friend of President Johnson's to the extent that he
22
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could talk privately with him in the Oval 0‘^fice. M ler also stated
that Evron offered the following comments on Johnson:
Johnson's feeling about Israel came out ’^ery early in
the crisis of 1957 when he was majority leader. When
at that time. President Eisenhower and Secretary of
State, Dulles, wanted to force us to withd-^aw from
Sinai, they threatened us with economic sanction.
Johnson persuaded Senator William Knowland of Califor¬
nia, who was then minority leader, to come with him to
the White House and tell the President that it wouldn't
do.26
The arrival in the Oval Office of President Johnson opened
the doors for more economic and political support, and, most import¬
antly, helping Israel in its military activities. President Johnson's
sympathy for Israel made him responsive to the demands of Israel and
its lobby in the United States. The President had surrounded himself
with a group of Jews and pro-Israeli sympathizers such as Mr. and Mrs.
Krim; Abraham Feinberg; Arthur Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations; Phillip Klutznick of Chicago; and the Rostow brothers, Walt
Rostow, Johnson's National Security adviser; and Eugene Rostow,
Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs. This same group
played a major role during the 1967 War in persuading the President to
send arms to Israel, to interrupt any sanctions against Israel in the
United Nations, and to avoid pressuring Israel to withdraw from the
27
newly occupied territories.
^^Findley , They Dare to Speak Out, p. 116.
Ephraim Evron, cited in Miller, Lyndon: An Oral Biography,
p. 478.
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp. 120-121.
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During the 1967 War, the United States came close to a con¬
frontation with Russia on behalf of Israel. According to Miller:
On June 10, just when a complete ceasefire seemed at
hand, Kosygin called Johnson on the hot line and
announced that unless Israel ‘unconditionally' halted
operations at once, the Soviet Union would be forced
to take action—military action. Where, Lyndon asked
his advisers assembled in the Situation Room, was the
Sixth Fleet at that moment? The Sixth Fleet, he was
informed was approximately 300 miles, or 10 to 20
hours,west of the Syrian coast, well out of its pre¬
scribed 100-mile limit. 'I [Johnson] told McNamara to
issue orders at once to change the course and cut the
restriction to fifty miles We all knew the
Russians would get the message as soon as the monitors
observed the change in the fleet's pattern. That mes¬
sage, which no translator would need to interpret to
the Kremlin leadership, was that the United States was
prepared to resist Soviet intrusion in the Middle East
There was some speculation among Arabs that the United States
Air Force participated on behalf of Israel during the early days of
the 1967 War. This allegation was indirectly proven when Miller
asserted that Ephraim Evron,
... went to various places, Miami, Los Angeles, every¬
where. He spoke to large groups of Jews, and he would
simply say, 'I can't tell you anything about the facts,
but let me tell you, I'm minister of Israel, and Lyndon
Johnson saved Israel'^9
The United States followed the military and the economic aid
to Israel with political aid. On June 19, 1967, President Johnson
enunciated five principles of peace in the Middle East. They are:
(1) Every nation in the area has a fundamental right
to live and to have this right respected by its
neighbors.
po




(2) Justice for the refugees. There will be no
peace for any party in the Middle East unless
this problem is attacked with new energy by
all and, certainly, primarily by those who are
immediately concerned.
(3) A third lesson from this last month is that
maritime rights must be respected ... the right
of innocent maritime passage must be preserved
for all nations.
(4) Now the waste and futility of the arms race must
be apparent to all the peoples of the world. And
now there is another moment of choice. The United
States of America, for its part, will use every
resource of diplomacy and every counsel of reason
and prudence to try to find a better course.
(5) Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of
respect for political independence and territorial
integrity of all the states of the area.^O
In spite of these enunciated principles, the Johnson administrarion
was decidedly pro-Israel and generously supported her request for aid.
The advent of the Nixon administration in 1969 added a new
dimension to American-Israel i relationship. This was manifested in
the establishment of contacts among pro-Israeli groups and American
universities, research organizations, business, labor unions, news¬
papers, publishing houses, citizen groups and political parties.
Some of these relationships were codified by the Israeli lobby which
provided a massive, sensitive and powerful political force in Wash-
31
ington and throughout the United States.
President Nixon described the special relationship between
Israeli Prime Ministers and American presidents as follows:
^°Polk, The Arab World, pp. 226-227.
^^Polk, The Elusive Peace, p. 112.
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Many people assume that this relationship is merely
a matter of politics. Politics enters into it, as
do shared ideals and strategic considerations. But
more fundamentally, Israel has a unique importance
to the United States because of its unique importance
to so many Americans. Every President is aware of
this and responds to it. To him Israel can never be
just another country.32
According to Findley, Nixon, however, was so faithful to this relation¬
ship that "he supported Israel so heavily in his first term as Presi¬
dent, that in the 1972 re-election campaign, Israel's ambassador to
33Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, openly campaigned for him."
William Rogers, the first Secretary of State who served under
Nixon, attempted to negotiate a peace settlement in the Middle East.
However, his efforts, initiatives, and authority were undermined by
a powerful group of pro-Israeli advisers who dominated the Nixon
inner circle and especially Henry Kissinger, National Security Adviser
and later Secretary of State, because Kissinger, at that time, was
opposed to any initiative which required Israel to give up occupied
34
territories in return for peace.
Henry Kissinger played a key role in masterminding and imple¬
menting policies that were more favorable to Israel. Mazlish reported
that Kissinger, "rescued the Israelis in the nick of time by organizing
35
a resupply of arms opposed by Schlesinger and the Defense Department,"
^^Richard Nixon, Leaders (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1982),
p. 283.
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 121.
^^Alan Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? 2nd ed.
(London: Sidwick and Jackson Ltd., 198b), p. 299.
^^Bruce Mazlish, Kissinger, the European Mind in American
Pol icy (New York: Basic Books, Ltd., 1976), p. 256.
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during the 1973 War between the Arabs and Israel. Findley al so asserted
that Kissinger "had, yielding to an Israeli request, agreed not to
communicate formally with the PLO until they recognized the right of
36Israel to exist," which has become an American commitment to date.
Also, Kissinger had anticipated that the Civil War in Lebanon would
37drive out and finish off the PLO, and he probably encouraged the
Israelis in undertaking this venture.
The Nixon administration rescued Israel during the October
1973 War by delivering American arms to Israel using the famous air¬
lift. According to Nixon:
... our airlift was having trouble getting off the ground.
It was stalling in the Pentagon, where critical hours
were lost trying to decide such matters as how many and
what kind of aircraft should be used. Kissinger told me
that the Pentagon wanted to send only three C-5A military
transports in order to cause fewer political difficulties
with Syria, Egypt, and the Soviets. I asked him how many
airplanes were available, and he answered about thirty.
Then I told him, 'I'll make the political decisions. We'll
take just as much heat for sending three planes as for
sending thirty.' Later, after still more bureaucratic
delays, I told Kissinger to tell the Pentagon to send
'everything that can fly.'^^
Concerning the American airlift, Nixon indicated that on "Saturday,
October 13, at 3:30 p.m., thirty C-130 transports were on their way
39to Israel. By Tuesday, we were sending in a thousand tons a day."
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp. 11-12.
^^Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?, pp. 418-420.
^^Nixon, Leaders, pp. 207-208.
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Book Co., Inc., 1979), p. 927.
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Polk indicated that the White House requested Congress to appropriate
$2.2 billion for military materials for the Israeli armed forces, and
that the United States airlifted 22,300 tons of equipment in thirty-
40
three days to Israel.
So concerned was the Nixon administration about the security
of Israel during the 1973 War that Nixon risked a nuclear confrontation
with the Soviets by putting the U.S. armed forces under a nuclear
alert. In addition, the administration contemplated a military inter-
41
vention in the Arabian Gulf in order to break the oil embargo.
However, shortly before his resignation. President Nixon
finally realized the danger in which he had placed the United States
by pursuing those pro-Israeli policies. As a result, Nixon decided
to cut off arms supplies to Israel until she agreed to a comprehensive
peace settlement. In a personal letter to King Faisal Bin Abdul-Aziz
of Saudi Arabia, Nixon stated that he would spare no efforts to realize
justice for the Palestinians. In another letter to the king, Nixon
stated that if he found his initiatives blocked by the Israeli lobby
in America and by Israel, he would throw away his prepared text during
his next State of the Union Message, and he would tell Americans live
on television and radio, the truth about Israel and its friends in the
U.S. and their role in preventing a peace settlement in the Middle
East. Nixon was about to tell the Americans how Israel and its lobby
were controlling the American policy. However, Hart was of the opinion
4n̂
Polk, The Arab World, p. 263.
^^Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? pp. 371-374.
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that when Israel and its lobby found out about Nixon^s plan, they
played a substantial role in the Watergate Scandal, which caused
42
Nixon's resignation.
When President Nixon's successor, Gerald Ford, came to office
in 1975, he declared that he would "reassess" the American policy in
the Middle East in an attempt to force Israel to seek a settlement
with her Arab neighbors. As usual, the Israeli lobby brought tremen¬
dous pressure to bear on the Senate to oppose reassessment. President
Ford dropped the reassessment venture, but such action still did not
43
win him votes from the Israeli lobby in his campaign the next year.
When Jimmy Carter came to office in 1976, he did so with the
help of the Israeli lobby. He received about 68 percent of the Jewish
vote, and this played a significant role in Carter's decision on who
would manage American foreign policy. The Israeli lobby persuaded
Carter to nominate as Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, instead of
George Ball, because Ball strongly objected to the pro-Israeli poli-
44
cies undertaken by previous American administrations. President
Carter's campaing declarations on human rights placed the Jewish emigra¬
tion from Russia as one of the most important key elements. According
to Shevchenko:
One element of Carter's thinking, the human rights
concerns which the Soviets had hoped were mostly
campaign rhetoric, had emerged instead as a central
^^Ibid., pp. 402-404.
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 122.
^^Ibid., pp. 122-125.
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element of U.S. foreign policy. This troublesome
development meant that Moscow could expect no move
to repeal the restriction which linked trade conces¬
sions to the emigration of Soviet Jews.45
Early in his administration. President Carter approved supply¬
ing Israel with sophisticated American arms that U.S. troops did not
even have. Findley asserted that:
When Jimmy Carter became president, the Israelis were
trying to get large quantities of the AIM 9-L, the
most advanced U.S. air-to-air missile. The Pentagon
kept saying, 'No, no, no. It isn't yet deployed to
U.S. troops. The production rate is not enough to
supply even U.S. needs. It is much too sensitive to
risk being lost.' Yet, early in his administration.
Carter overruled the Pentagon, and Israel got the
missiles.^°
Moreover, Israel violated the terms governing the usage of United
States-supplied weapons (i.e., usage for self-defense purposes only)
when she bombed villages in Lebanon. The Carter administration, how¬
ever, failed to invoke any sanctions against Israel.
However, during the Carter administration, some positive
developments occurred. He was the first American president since
Truman who referred to the rights of Palestinians to their homeland.
President Carter wanted to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement
between the Arabs and Israel, but Israeli objections and pressure by
pro-Israelis in the United States forced him to limit the peace
45
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settlement to only Egypt and Israel. President Carter made it
clear that the Palestinians, including the PLO, would have to be
49somehow included in the discussion of peace.
Due to these developments, Hart indicated that between 1976
and 1977, President Carter and his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance,
restored some sanity and decency to American policy in the Middle
East. Hart also stated that Vance was interested in real peace and
as a good human being, he understood Arafat better than any American
50before or since. The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, himself
conceded that "In the Carter and Vance years, there was no major
conspiracy against us. Vance was really a good man and he tried very
51
much to help us."
In August 1979, Andrew Young, the American Ambassador to the
UN had met with Zuhdi Terzi, the PLO's UN observer, in violation of
the U.S. pledge to Israel not to talk to the PLO. This private meet¬
ing was leaked to the press via Israeli intelligence, and under strong
Israeli pressure. Young left his job despite his warm friendship with
52the President.
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In September 1978, Sadat and Begin joined Carter at Camp
David, Maryland,to seek a framework for peace in the Middle East.
This meeting took place under somewhat strenuous circumstances: (1)
Carter's career was about to collapse; (2) Carter was very weak in
pressuring Begin (3) Carter was seeking a second term and he knew
the great power of the Israeli lobby; (4) Begin is hard-headed, and it
was difficult to persuade him to compromise; and (5) Sadat could not
go back to Cairo without achieving anything, or it could mean his end.
Under these circumstances and others, the Camp David framework became
a peace settlement between Egypt and Israel, but nothing substantial
was offered to the Palestinians. In spite of this, the three leaders
53
signed the final draft in the White House on Monday, March 26, 1979.
Ronald Reagan's assumption of the presidency eroded the modicum
of support for a Palestinian homeland achieved under the Carter admin¬
istration. Reagan stubbornly held the view that peace between the Arabs
and Israel could be achieved without the concurrence or participation
of the PLO. However, Reagan was obliged to recognize some linkage
between different parts of the Middle East and so he had to modify his
54
belief that the Palestinian issue could be kept in a tight compartment.
Hart indicated that Yasser Arafat believed that when Reagan
and his Secretary of State, Haig, came to power they were determined
to succeed where Kissinger had failed. He also indicated that the
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Israeli Minister of Defense, Sharon, had a conversation in Washington
with the U.S. Secretary of State, Haig, on May 20, 1982. During the
conversation, Haig gave Sharon the green light to invade Lebanon and
to finish the PLO.^^
In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon in order to break the
backbone of the PLO's support. The war was a savage and destructive
one. Many civilians were killed and thousands were left homeless.
The Israeli purpose became clear as Israeli troops closed in on
Beirut, where the PLO fighters were trapped along with half a million
civilians. The PLO troops were evacuated from Beirut and Israel took
56
control of the city.
Despite the assurances by the United States to guarantee the
safety of all Palestinian refugees in Beirut, including the families
of the PLO fighters who had departed from Beirut, Israel and its
Christian Lebanese allies committed the infamous massacres of Sabra
57
and Chatila in which more than 2,000 Palestinians were massacred.
On September 1, 1982, President Reagan declared a plan for
peace in the Middle East. According to Hart;
Reagan said three things: 'yes' to self-government
in association with Jordan for those Palestinians
already living in the occupied territories; 'no' to
an independent Palestinian state; and 'yes' in prin¬
ciple to the idea (as required by 242) that Israel
should withdraw from territory occupied in 1967 to
^^Hart, Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker? pp. 450-451.
^^Regan, Israel and the Arabs, pp. 44-45.
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allow the Palestinians to be self-governing. That was
the essence of the Reagan PI an.58
Concerning the Reagan plan. Hart indicated that the PLO in some way
accepted the Reagan plan or at least did not reject it, but Israel
59
rejected the plan outright. Israel succeeded in involving the United
States militarily in the Lebanon War in which, "239 marines were killed
in a single suicide raid in October of 1983 after the U.S. Navy bom¬
barded Shi'ite and Druze positions from off shore.
In 1983, President Reagan sought his second term of office and
went all out for the Jewish vote. To obtain the Israeli lobby support,
Reagan took two actions. The first action was upgrading the position
of the White House liaison with the Jewish community. The second action
was an announcement from President Reagan to increase the level of aid
to Israel and that in the future all aid to Israel would be in the form
of a grant. In addition, Reagan agreed that $250 million in U.S. aid
funds could be spent in Israel to help finance the manufacture of a
new Israeli warplane.
President Reagan:
... proposed a new higher level of 'strategic coopera¬
tion' in the military field and a free trade relation¬
ship which would make Israel the only nation with tariff-
free access to both the European community and the United
States.62
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The Reagan administration has faced two scandals during its
second term. First, the Iranian Arms Sale, in which Israel played a
key role in involving the Reagan administration in dealing and supplying
arms to Iran. The U.S. expressed policy concerning Iran was contradicted
by this action. Officially, the U.S. declared Iran a supporter of world¬
wide terrorism; as such, Washington would have no dealings whatsoever
with Iran. Americans were shocked to learn about the involvement of
their government in complicity with Israel in pursuing such action. More
importantly, however, the U.S. lost its credibility among its allies in
the Middle East.^^
The second incident involved was a spy case. Despite the on¬
going cooperation between the intelligence services of the U.S. and
Israel, Israel recruited former U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, Jonathan
Pollard, to sell U.S. defense secrets to Israel. The Americans, including
the American Jews, were surprised and horrified by this disclosure, and
they called on the U.S. government to take steps to prevent such actions
64
by the Israelis.
On September 15, 1987, the Reagan administration ordered that
the PLO's office in Washington, D.C. be closed within a month. In addi¬
tion, Congress passed a bill authorizing the closure of the office of the
PLO representative to the United Nations in New York. In spite of the
fact that this bill by Congress contravenes the terms governing the
^^"The Iran Arms Deal," The Washington Post, February 23, 1987,
vol. 4, no. 17, p. 12.
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agreement between the U.S. and the United Nations, can the Congress and
the Reagan administration remain adamant? The PLO is now challenging
the closure of its Washington, D.C. office in the courts, and a decision
will be rendered soon. Both the PLO and the United Nations General
Assembly have denounced the Congressional bill.
As a response to the ongoing rebellion in the occupied terri¬
tories of Gaza and the West Bank, the Reagan administration sent Secretary
65
of State, George Shultz, to the Middle East with a peace plan, which
might be an initial step toward the proposed International Conference.
However, on March 17, 1988, in a television interview, the Prime Minister
of Israel, Yitzhak Shamir, denounced the American peace plan.
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Palestinians," The New York Times, February 26, 1988, vol. CXXXVII, no.
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VI. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
The previous review of American Israeli relationships since
the Truman administration until the present indicated that the Zionist
and pro-Israeli lobby has played a significant role in shaping American
foreign policy in the Middle East. The Zionist lobby in the United
States has completely dominated, orchestrated and shaped these pro-
Israeli policies through pressuring, dominating, and manipulating: (a)
the White House, (b) the Congress, (c) the media, (d) the academic com¬
munity, and (e) the churches.
First: Pressuring the White House
At the center of the policy-making process are the
President and the White House staff. The president has
ultimate responsibility for foreign affairs, but he is
limited in the degree to which he is able to keep abreast
of all of the problems requiring his attention ... the
White House is primarily the recipient, the collator, and
finally the arbiter of the suggestions, recommendations,
and studies that are produced throughout the government.^
Paul Findley stated that there are three levels of Zionist
pressure over the White House: (1) a direct pressure upon the Presi¬
dent comes through the personal relationships between the President and
Zionists; (2) pressure comes through officials close to the President
such as his advisers who are on good terms with some of the Zionists;
^Willard A. Beling, ed.. The Middle East: Quest for American




and (3) pressure comes through the top levels of the departments, e.g.,
2
the State Department, Defense Department and National Security Council.
Regarding the first level of pressure, the Zionists in the
United States and in Israel have used several strategies to exert
effective pressure upon the President of the United States through
their sizeable financial contributions to presidential campaigns and
the delivery of Jewish votes to selected candidates. In return, these
Zionists extract concessions from these candidates and when elected,
these individuals are bound to honor the dictates of the Zionist
lobby, especially since most of the U.S. presidents since Truman sought
another presidential term.
President Kennedy was aware of the impact of this Zionist
pressure during his own campaigns and the damage that this pressure
has inflicted upon the American political system. As a result, he
stated that if he ever became president,
... he would push for a law that would subsidize presi¬
dential campaigns out of the U.S. Treasury. He added
that whatever the cost of this subsidy, it would insu¬
late presidential candidates in the future from this
kind of pressure and save the country a lot of grief in
the long run.^
The Zionists are aware of the importance of having personal relationship
with the President in order to win his sympathy to the Zionist cause
and agenda. Shadid discussed two classic examples of this type of
p
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relationship. He stated that the ardent Zionist, Louis Brandeis, who
was a close friend of President Wilson's not only influenced the Presi¬
dent to such an extent that Wilson publicly referred to himself as a
Zionist, but also influenced the President to prevail upon the British
leaders to issue the Balfour Declaration. In addition, Shadid main¬
tained that the personal relationship between President Roosevelt and
Rabbi Wise significantly influenced the President to encourage the
British government to permit the entry of 100,000 Jewish refugees to
Palestine in 1934.^
The same type of special personal relationship existed between
President Truman and Ed Jacobson, as well as between President Johnson
and Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Krim. Findley is of the opinion that once
such relationships are established, they provide almost permanent
access to the White House, irrespective of the administration in power.
This explains the frequency of visits to the White House by individuals
such as Abraham Feinberg of New York and Philip Klutznick of Chicago,
former President of B'nai B'rith.^
The Zionist pressure exerted over the White House which comes
through the secretaries, advisors, under-secretaries and other members
in the administration, is equally important, and effective, as the
direct Zionist pressure exerted upon the President. This type of
^Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, p. 25.
^Ibid., pp. 31-32.
^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp. 115-116.
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pressure directed at the administrative levels of the United States is
manifested in the following manner:
(1) Secretaries, advisors, and under-secretaries whose views
are solicited by the President manage to introduce their pro-Israeli
biases into the policy formation processes. (2) Some Zionists who
could occupy strategic positions within an administration use these
positions as platforms to champion the adoption of pro-Israeli policies.
Henry Kissinger, former National Security Advisor and former Secretary
of State during the Nixon administration, is a classic example. (3)
Some of the important actors in the administration are pro-Israeli
simply because of their interrelation with the Jewish community in the
United States. The Zionist, of course, use them as effective channels
to carry their views to the President. The Rostow brothers, Walt and
Eugene, are good examples of pro-Israeli administrative actors.
Second: Influencing Congress
According to David Garnham:
Congress' foreign affairs role is typically marginal,
but American-Israeli relations are an exception. His¬
torically, Congress' role has been large in this issue-
area, and Congress is consistently more supportive of
Israel than is the executive branch.7
Regarding congressional support for Israel, Richard Curtiss
made the following observations:
^David Garnham, cited in Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing Image:
American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute (Washington, O.C.:
The American Educational Trust, 1982), p. 165.
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(1) Support for Israel inside Congress does not seem to be
based on party politics. Both Republican and Democratic members have
supported Israel, (2) Congressional liberals support Israel more
than do Congressional conservatives^ (3) Regional differences have
also determined how a Congressman will vote on the Middle East. Pro-
Israel support is strongest in the industrialized, urbanized states
of the northeast, and weaker in the south and the less populous heart¬
land of the country. Particularly striking is the weak support for
Israel in the Rocky Mountain states, (4) Senators who come from
states with relatively larger percentages of Jewish voters are more
likely to vote in favor of Israel's interest than are those with
smaller percentages of Jewish voters, (5) Congressmen are aware that
their voting records on Israel-relevant issues will be closely and
publicly scrutinized by pro-Israeli groups. Therefore, most of them
are afraid of the Zionist lobby, because it has the power to destroy
O
their political future when they vote against Israeli interest.
The Zionist influence over the Congress was instrumental in
obtaining the passage of a resolution in 1922 by the Sixty-seventh
Congress which declared that the United States favored the establish¬
ment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. Again in
1944, Congress proposed that the American government use its good
offices to open the doors of Palestine for the Jews. In 1968, the




she congratulated Israel on its twentieth anniversary.
The Zionist or pro-Israeli lobby exerts influence on Congress
through the following:
(1) Financial contributions from Jews were used to support pro-
Israeli Congressmen during Congressional campaigns for election or re-
election. Curtiss stated that "there is some evidence to support the
contention that Jews, as a group, do contribute heavily to Congressional
and Presidential campaigns. However, it is not possible to determine
accurately the size or the recipients of these campaign contributions."^*^
(2) Since the Jews are a minority group in the United States,
they offset their numerical weakness as a voting group or a bloc and
and they are quick to articulate their policy preferences to their repre¬
sentatives in Congress.
(3) The Zionists in the United States use their financial aid
and their voting power in influencing elected officials to make decla-
12
rations of political support for Israel.
(4) The Zionists distribute their propaganda material. The Near
East Report, to every member of Congress. The Near East Report is a
newsletter prepared by the Zionist lobby, AIPAC, in Washington, D.C.,
Q
Beling, The Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, pp.
287-289.
^*^Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the
Arab-Israeli Dispute, p. 167.
^^Ibid.
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and express the Zionists' viewpoints about the Middle East.
(5) The Zionist lobby secretly spies on the members of Congress
in order to know their attitudes and views about Israel. According to
Findley:
One day, in a private conversation in the Committee
Room, I voiced a brief criticism of Israel's military
attack on Syria. A senior Republican, William S. Bloom¬
field of Michigan, responded with a smile, 'Wait till 'Si'
Kenen over at AIPAC hears what you've said. He was refer¬
ring to I. L. Kenen, the executive director of AIPAC.
AIPAC sometimes finds out what Congressmen say about Middle
East policy even in private conversation, and those who
criticize Israel do so at their political peril.
(6) Zionists and their representative lobby, AIPAC, threaten
Congressmen in different ways such as withholding contributions, with¬
drawing political support on a wide range of policy issues and attacking
Congressmen directly through the mass media. There are many examples of
the victims of the Zionist lobby. For instance, James Abourezk, Charles
Percy, J. William Ful bright, Paul Findley, George Ball, Paul McCloskey,
Georgia Ann Geyer, James Ennes, Miriam Ward, Philip Klutznick, Shila
Scoville, Adlai Stevenson III, and Jesse Jackson. Some of these indi¬
viduals were defeated during elections and their only crime was that
they criticized Israel.
Third: Dominating the Mass Media
The print media and the electronic press are still the primary
sources of information for American leaders and opinion makers. The
^^Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians, pp. 169-170.
^^Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 25.
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lionists successfully built a very strong iron curtain over the United
States by dominating the media. Dr. Alfred Lilienthal expressed his
view about the cowed media in the United States when he stated that:
The known presence of a plethora of Jewish organizations,
ever ready to brandish the anti-Semitic label, has imparted
so powerful a sensitivity that discussion, muted doubts and
debate on the grave issues involved have been nearly totally
crushed. Any and all criticism of the policies of the State
of Israel have been stifled. Americans have become totally
convinced that whatever is good for the Zionist state is twice
as good for the United States. With the aid of a cowed media,
the relentless, concerted and gigantic efforts of Zionism have
excluded all information pertaining to any understanding of the
rights of the Palestinian people.
Concerning the iron curtain which the Zionists have built over
the U.S. to blind the American public about facts concerning the Pales¬
tinian issue. Dr. Israel Shahak indicated that it is "forbidden" (of
course by the Zionist lobby) in the United States to say, for example,
that the atrocities committed by the Israelis against the Palestine
people, as well as the bombardment of the Palestinian refugee camps,
constitute war crimes. He indicated that he was threatened here in
the United States because of his sympathy for the Palestinian cause.
Moreover, the Zionists in the U.S. campaigned against him and demanded
16
that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem dismiss him.
Most of the important newspapers, such as The New York Times
in the United States are either owned directly by Jews or are dominated
by Jewish staff and editorsj of course, these newspapers usually
^^Alfred M. Lilienthal, "What Price Repression?", Middle East
Perspective (New York), November 1979, p. 2.
^^Israel Shahak, "What Price Totalitarianism?" Middle East
Perspective (New York), October 1977, pp. 3-4.
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express the viewpoints of the owners. According to Curtiss, The Chris¬
tian Science Monitor and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch were the only
newspapers that could criticize Israel, and the Monitor was alone in
supporting the Arab countries and the Palestinians.^^
In a letter to the Middle East Perspective, a reader expressed
his views about the Zionist influence over the newspapers in the United
States when he said: "From The New York Times to The Los Angeles Times,
from the Long Beach Independent Press-Telegram to Long Island dailies,
18
the slanting and anti-Arab bigotry is documented heavily.
Television networks in the United States are the first and the
most dramatic shapers of public information on the Middle East. The
Zionists also have an influence over the television networks. A
former ABC Middle East correspondent, Peter Jennings, agreed that any
criticism of Israel would be met with a cry of anti-Semitism. Marilyn
Robinson, then an NBC Washington reporter, indicated that being fair
with the Palestinians on television would bring trouble for the
19
reporter and that was exactly what happened to her.
TV Guide reviewed 10 months of coverage on the nightly
news shows from logs and tapes supplied by the Vanderbilt
University Television News Archives—from July 1980 through
April 1981. There were 38 reports of raids and retalia¬
tions by both sides; 24 of the 38 were Israeli raids on
Palestinian targets in South Lebanon. Only three of these
l^Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-
Israeli Dispute, pp. 145-149.
18"Perspective Subscribers Protest to the Press," Middle East
Perspective (New York: April 1975), p. 2.
^^Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-
Israeli Dispute, pp. 149-151.
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reports--for a total of one minute, 10 seconds—showed
pictures of the effects of the Israeli attacks. None
showed any Palestinian victims. On the other hand, of
the 14 reports of Palestinian raids and attacks on
Israel during the period, II included pictures of Israeli
victims, and the filmed reports totaled some 17 minutes.^®
Cinema in the United States is owned and controlled by Zionists,
and this medium is used by the Zionists to fan the flames of hostility
between Americans and Arabs by degrading Arabs in these films. During
1986, the following movies - Delta Force, Protocol, and Not Quite
Jerusalem, were released in the United States, and these movies basi¬
cally depicted Arabs as buffoons and primitive. In 1987, the movie,
Ishtar, was produced carrying the same message of the other three
movies. Arab Americans have protested against these movies and charged
21that the Zionists in the U.S. were responsible for such distortions.
William Quandt noted that during the 1950s and 1960s, the
"Israeli's side of the story has been heard repeatedly in the press, in
22
schools, and in other mass media."
Fourth: Manipulating Universities,
Institutes and Research Centers
It is a fact that universities, institutes and research centers
in the United States play an important role in the society, and, the
American Zionists are aware of this fact. The decision making process
in the United States is influenced by academic institutions, whether
2°Ibid., pp. 151-152.
21
Ebrahim Awad, "A New Offending to the Arabs in the American
Cinema," Al-Majalla [The Magazine] (London: January 6-12, 1988), pp.
44-47.
22William Quandt, cited in Beling, The Middle East: Quest for
an American Policy, p. 282.
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private or public. The formulation of American foreign policy depends
upon the advice and research of the scholars and experts inside these
23
academic institutions.
Apart from academic institutions, the Zionists or pro-Israelis
directed or controlled organizations such as (1) the Foreign Relations
Council in New York; (2) Washington Institute of the Near East Poli¬
cies; and (3) the Council of International Security in Washington,
24
D.C., and they have been used to influence U.S. policy.
The Zionist lobby in the United States has engaged in activities
aimed at discouraging the dissemination of information favorable to the
Arabs as well as undermining academic freedom. Such activities include:
(1) The prevention of the establishment of a $1 million King
Faisal endowed chair in Islamic and Arabic Studies at the University
of Southern California. The Zionist lobbied inside and outside the
25
university and prevented the establishment. The Zionists also tar¬
geted some universities for criticism. These universities include
Georgetown, Swathmore, MIT, the University of Alabama, the University
of Pennsylvania, the University of Texas and Duke University. The only
crime that these universities have committed is that they established
chairs for Middle Eastern Studies and they accepted grants from Arabs.
23
Ahmed Al-Barsan, "How the American Universities Make the White
House and the State Department Decisions," Al-Majalla [The Magazine]
(London: January 20-26, 1988), p. 20.
2^Ibid., pp. 20-22.
25ibid., p. 21.
^^Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-
Israeli Dispute, p. 162.
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(2) Creating trouble for any student or faculty member who
dares to speak frankly or criticize Israel.
At one of America's largest state universities, a
Jewish graduate student reported that his non-Jewish
faculty adviser warned him away from a Palestine-oriented
and toward an Egypt-oriented dissertation topic so that
he would not jeopardize his chances of future university
employment by acquiring the reputation of being anti-
Israel. At another of America's most prestigious univer¬
sities, an outspoken pro-Arab professor asserted that
‘only my tenure and the conspiracy laws protect me in an
institution where more than half of my colleagues are
Jewish and where almost no one else, Jew or Gentile, dares
to speak frankly about Israel. "27
(3) Ensuring that individuals who are Zionists and pro-Israeli
obtain sensitive positions within universities and research centers
so that they can use these strategic positions to influence the
28
decision-making process.
Fifth: Obtaining Christian Churches' Sympathy
According to Ladd, "The American populace is now roughly 64
percent Protestant, 25 percent Catholic, 2 percent of other religions,
29
while 7 percent have no religious preference."
Grace Hal sell notes that fundamentalism in the U.S. came under
Zionist influence to the extent that we find Christian Zionists who
are the most loyal, and the most fanatical supporters of militant
^^Ibid., pp. 161-162.
28
Ahmed Al-Barsan, "How the American Universities Make the
White House and the State Department Decisions," pp. 21-22.
29
Everett Carl! Ladd, The American Polity: The People and
their Government (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1985), p. 42.
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Zionism. She indicated that the Christian Zionists be! ieve that the
30
creation of Israel is the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy.
Zionist and pro-Israeli forces in the United States have won
the sympathy of Christians by engaging in the following:
(1) The Zionists have used the Christian theological institutes
as instruments to influence the churches and the clergies. The
Zionists slipped their interpretation about the Old Testament, which
includes many legends about the Promised Land and God's Chosen People,
into the educational programs of the Christian theological institutes
in the United States.
(2) Inviting the American clergies to visit the Holy Land
either by Israeli-sponsored tours or pro-Israeli sponsored tours. Such
tours are regulated by Zionists inside the United States and by
Zionists in Israel, as a way of influencing the clergies in order to
3?
obtain their sympathy and their followers' sympathy, too.
(3) Holding conferences and meetings between the Zionists and
the Christians. The American Zionists and the American Christians,
for instance, were represented in the first Christian Zionist Congress
of August 1985 at Basle, Switzerland. The aim of these meetings was
33
to gain the Christians' support for Israel.
^^Grace Hal sell, "Why Christian Zionists Support Israel," Arab
Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: February-March 1986):16-20.
^^Henry Ford, The International Jew: The First Problem Facing
the World [Prepared from the original copy by Gerald K. Smith, trans-
lated to Arabic by Khairi Hammad] (Beirut: The Trade Office of Print¬
ing, Distributing and Publishing, 1962), pp. 31-33.
^^Grace Halsell, "Why Christian Zionists Support Israel," p. 20.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions
Grier Stephenson, Jr. et al. define interest groups as "associa¬
tions of people who hold common views and who work together to influ¬
ence what government does. Their interest is a position, benefit or
advantage that they want to protect and perhaps enlarge."^
Interest groups are therefore permanent fixtures of American
politics. In fact, there are those who maintain that because of the
ethnic diversity of the American society, American society and politics
will of necessity be group-conscious. However, all the various groups
in the society do not have the same type of impact on the policy-making
process. The success of any interest group is largely dependent upon
its resource base and size; but more importantly is the group's access
to the corridors of power and decision-making.
The pro-Israeli lobby is considered as one of the most potent
groups in this countrv'. The findings of this study indicate that this
lobby has been able to dominate the formulation of America's policy in
the Middle East. It has accomplished this objective by exerting its
influence and pressure on the following institutions: (a) the White
House, (b) the Congress, (c) the media, (d) the academic community,
and (e) churches.
^D. Grier Stephenson, Jr. et al., American Government (New York:
Harper and Row Publishers, 1988), p. 221.
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The pro-Israeli lobby has won the support of these institutions
by engaging in a set of activities,-including:
(1) bankrolling presidential and congressional campaigns;
(2) targeting alleged anti-Israel candidates for defeat;
(3) influencing the selection of key administrative personnel;
(4) controlling the media through ownership and domination of
boards;
(5) determining editorial policies of the media;
(6) providing endowed chairs, financial support and scholar¬
ships to academic institutions and research centers;
(7) organizing Israeli-sponsored tours to the Holy Land; and
(8) accusing individuals who express critical views about
Israel as anti-Semitic.
Recommendations
As a result of its dominant role in American politics, the pro-
Israel lobby, in my opinion, will compromise America's long term
interests in the Middle East by its blind support of Israel. In view
of this, the writer offers the following recommendations:
(a) The U.S* Congress should undertake a comprehensive review
of America's policy in the Middle East.
(b) A new Middle East policy should be adopted by Congress
that should encompass the right of the Palestinians to self-
determination and a homeland, and withdrawal of Israeli troops to the
internationally recognized boundaries.
(c) All presidential and congressional campaigns should be
53
finaaced from the U.S. treasury and a ceiling be set on all campaign
expenditures.
(d) Arab-Americans should strengthen their organizations and
join forces with other minorities to put pressure on the White House
and Congress.
(e) Arab-Americans should participate actively in supporting
causes that are championed by other minorities in order to establish
harmonious working relationships with these groups.
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